Abstract: Conditional cash transfer programs typically direct cash benefits to mothers to promote child welfare. Growing adolescent autonomy, however, raises questions about whether mothers remain the best recipients. This paper examines how the identities of conditional cash transfer (CCT) recipients—mothers versus adolescents—shape schooling, intrahousehold decision-making, and individual welfare. Using Mexico’s 2015 Pilot Program for Changing PROSPERA High School Scholarship Recipients (PCRB), which randomly reassigned scholarship payments from mothers to adolescents, I estimate a three-member collective labor-supply model with a father, a mother, and an adolescent. Household members derive utility from leisure, private consumption, and public goods, such as the adolescent’s schooling time and a joint monetary investment in the adolescent’s education. The model, estimated using detailed PCRB follow-up data, assumes Cobb-Douglas preferences and includes random coefficients to capture heterogeneity in preferences for adolescent education. The ongoing estimation will quantify household members’ willingness to pay for adolescent education and assess treatment effects on structural outcomes, including Pareto weights and welfare indices. Planned counterfactuals will evaluate alternative designs, including replacing cash with in-kind education support, additional time commitments, and reallocating transfers across members.
Abstract: Conditional cash transfer programs typically direct cash benefits to mothers to promote child welfare. Growing adolescent autonomy, however, raises questions about whether mothers remain the best recipients. This paper examines how the identities of conditional cash transfer (CCT) recipients—mothers versus adolescents—shape schooling, intrahousehold decision-making, and individual welfare. Using Mexico’s 2015 Pilot Program for Changing PROSPERA High School Scholarship Recipients (PCRB), which randomly reassigned scholarship payments from mothers to adolescents, I estimate a three-member collective labor-supply model with a father, a mother, and an adolescent. Household members derive utility from leisure, private consumption, and public goods, such as the adolescent’s schooling time and a joint monetary investment in the adolescent’s education. The model, estimated using detailed PCRB follow-up data, assumes Cobb-Douglas preferences and includes random coefficients to capture heterogeneity in preferences for adolescent education. The ongoing estimation will quantify household members’ willingness to pay for adolescent education and assess treatment effects on structural outcomes, including Pareto weights and welfare indices. Planned counterfactuals will evaluate alternative designs, including replacing cash with in-kind education support, additional time commitments, and reallocating transfers across members.
Abstract: India’s food security system relies on two large programs: the Public Distribution System (PDS), which provides subsidized food to most households, and the Mid-Day Meal (MDM) scheme, which offers free school meals to children. Despite substantial public spending, child undernutrition remains widespread, and existing evidence on program effectiveness is mixed. This paper develops a structural model of household decision making to study how families value children’s development and how food security programs shape investments in schooling and nutrition. The analysis jointly examines the PDS and MDM, assessing whether they act as substitutes or complements and whether they protect children’s development against adverse shocks. The framework is used to conduct counterfactual policy experiments, offering guidance on how food subsidy design can be improved to enhance child outcomes.
Is Universal Scholarship Good for Everyone? The Role of Cash Transfers on School Choice," with Victor Delgado and Rui Zeng.
The Impact of Being "Left Behind" on Children's Health Development: A Consequence of China's Immigration Restriction